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UDK: 316.48 (497.15)
Original Scientific Paper
Received August 10 1995.

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, NATIONS OR SOCIAL CLASSES? The case study of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Paper questions the "Clash of civilizations" and "Nation states' power struggle' thesis" capacity to explain the phenomena of "fusion" processes in the welfare states of Western Europe and "fission" processes in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the increase of religiously and ethnically "colored" wars at the end of XX century. Avoiding holistic fallacy of dealing with civilizations and nation states as homogenous entities, author underlines the changing local and international social classes' alliances as the main subjects of intrinsically related processes of social disintegration/integration. Author analyses contemporary wars within the context of an enlarged production's structural crisis on the world level and of the accompanying changes of development ideologies and strategies, which in different ways affect particular social groups. The articulation of war aims in terms of the nation and religion at the end of XX century is interpreted as an efficacious substitution for compromised secular ideologies. The function of these ideologies, however, remains the same: legitimization and mobilization for violent defense of the old, or the creation of the new, social division of labor, both within particular societies organized in nation states as well as among them. The historico-geographic and ethnico-confessional concentration of commanding and executive social roles in local and international division of labor and resources, causes class interests to be formulated in status group (religious, ethnic) terms.

This hypothesis is checked in the case study on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Empirical basis for theoretical conclusions is drawn from two sources: 1) census data on the ethnic, religious, educational and occupational population structure; 2) data collected in the research of Consortium of Yugoslav social science institutes from 1989/90 on the importance of nation state, desirable organization of society and on the degree of homogeneity/conflictiveness between social groups' interests.

Key words: paradigm, civilization, nation state, class, index of participation, ethnic and confessional identity, war.

In this article I would like to demonstrate that neither civilisation- nor national-centered paradigm, could provide suitable theoretical framework for the explanation of intrinsically related social integration/disintegration processes causing the armed conflicts at the end of XXth century. Instead of these I am about to propose class-centered paradigm as a more suitable one.

As a specific testing ground and the example for analytical capacities of these three paradigms to cope with, I propose the case of war analysis in Bosnia and Herzegovina (thereafter B&H). This former republic with its ethnic, confessional, socio-economic and political heterogeneity has reflected the whole burden of social complexity of former Yugoslavia. Former Yugoslavia on its side, has represented in small the totality of social integrative/disintegrative processes occurring in the contemporary world on the large scale.

Empirical test ground for critical valuation of the first two paradigms and to maintain the explanatory power of class-centered paradigm is drawn from combination of two data

sources: 1) the census data on the ethnic and occupational population structure; 2) the data-base collected during the social structure and quality of life research accomplished by Consortium of Yugoslav social science in 1989/90.¹

Civilization-centered paradigm

Slightly confused by the unexpected acceleration of the world restructuration processes spurred by the disintegration of USSR, COMECON and Warsaw pact, on the one hand, by integration of Western Europe, Atlantic and Pacific regions under the mutually competing leaderships of reunited Germany, USA and Japan respectively, on the other, as well as by the ascendancy of religious and ethnic armed conflicts, analysts of international affairs began to search for the new explanatory paradigm (Vratuša-Žunjić, 1994: 7-24).

Thus Samuel P. Huntington, to begin with, in his resuscitation of the old "civilization paradigm" asserts that in the "post-Cold War world" the main factor "responsible" for sparking of wars is neither the division of states and social groups into wealthy and poor, nor into democratic and undemocratic. Key conflict determinant becomes, according to his main thesis, division of states and social groups into different civilizations. Their main distinguishing traits are found in different religiously inspired stances on the relationship of human beings to god and on the relative importance of the rights and duties, freedom and authority, equality and hierarchy. Nations, states, economic or political interests are substituted for world religions as the very core of collective identity, as well as the dominant source of motivation and mobilizing force. Huntington claims that civilization paradigm accounts for many important developments in international affairs occurring in recent years, including the downfall of Yugoslavia and the ongoing war there between Serbs, Croats and Muslims (Huntington, 1993a; 1993b).

It is true that in this part of the globe religion has been for centuries, and still is, one of the determining elements of ethnic belonging and identity. It can be sustained by documented facts provided in 1989/90 research that in B&H 94.8% of examinees who declared to be Catholics by confession also declared to be Croats by nationality. The same holds true for 93.8% believers in Allah who declared to be Muslims by nationality as well as for 92.7% Orthodox Christians who at the same time declared themselves to be Serbs by nationality.

Whenever it comes to armed conflict between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in B&H it has figuratively fratricidal character. It is the historical fact that precisely here it happened the most often that the population of the same ethnic origin (mostly Serbian and some Croatian² during the rule of Ottoman empire, passed from Orthodoxy to Islam

¹ The most recent paper using the same data base was published by Cvejić, Slobodan and Ilić Vladimir on nationalism in Kosovo and Mitohyan (K&M) in periodical *Sociological Review*, No.4, 1994, 505-517.

² According to the oldest written source, *De Administrando Imperio* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Byzantine czar (913-956), one of his predecessors, czar Irakliye (610-641) left to Serbs vast deserted territory between river Sava and Dinara mountains for settlement. It was just next to Croats who settled on the other side

in order to preserve land-owning rights and other privileges as well as to safeguard the life itself. One must recall that religious belonging coincided with class belonging in Ottoman empire: Serbs and Croats who remained Orthodox or Catholic became serfs while Islamized Serbs and Croats joined the ranks with Turkish nobility and administrators.³ Jointly with the faith of conquerors they also accepted the obligation to defend their state, ruthlessly resisting national liberation risings in B&H. After the Berlin Congress in 1878 those who could not stand that their former Christian serfs were issued the deeds on the land,⁴ that Christian church bells ring and that Muslim women may marry Christian man, emigrated to nearest territories with Islamic order. They never gave up the hope to return on the territories of former Ottoman Empire and to restore universal pan-Islamic state under the rule of Khalif.

On the other hand, many Orthodox Serbs under the pressure also converted into Catholicism. This process in B&H after 1878 was intensified, for Austro-Hungarian rule closed Orthodox church schools, forbade Orthodox Serbs to enter the state apparatus, stimulated the opening of new Catholic schools and the conversion of Muslims to Catholicism. Discriminated Serbs attempted through conversion to obtain the possibility of better education and jobs (Kraljačić, 1987). Religion in these parts so often separated parents from children and children of the same parents from one another. According to old Serbian sayings, converts have the urge to be "better Muslims than the Caliph" and "better Catholics than the Pope". The same language spoken by members of all three confessions in B&H did not have integrative influence strong enough to countervail the disintegrative influence of the conflicts-ridden historic heritage expressed in religious terms.

Civilization-centered paradigm, however, accounts only for outwardly, i.e. the most visible ethnic/religious expression form of social conflicts. However, the more suitable explanatory paradigm, should be able to distinguish deeper layers of armed conflicts' determinism from the ideological articulation of war aims. It is worthwhile noting that church dignitaries made this distinction more clearly during the XVIIth century's "religious wars", fought most directly over dogmatic theological issues, than some of the contemporary proponents of civilization paradigm are doing it nowadays.⁵ The genuine research problem is to explain why and how the dominant ideological expression form of

of river Pliva, closer to Frankish Kingdom, Venice, Vatican and Hungary. In medieval times Serbian and Croatian aristocratic families interchanged on the Bosnian throne. Typical is the case of the most powerful ruler Stefan Tvrtko I (1353-91) crowned in Milesheva (Serbia) in 1377 as the King of Serbia, Bosnia and Dalmatia (*Istorija srpskog naroda*, 1981: t.I, 145; t.II, 8-9;50).

³ Islamization of Serbs was intensified after the great migration of Serbs in 1690 from Kosovo and Mitohyan, parts of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Rashka. In lesser degree it has been lasting in XIX century, and it stopped only after the final liberation from Turks in 1912 (Terzić, 1994: 53).

⁴ From that time Serbs own more than 60% of B&H soil.

⁵ Pope Sixtus V pointed out, for instance, that "the preservation of the Catholic religion, which is the principal aim of the pope, is only a pretext for His Majesty (the Spanish king), whose principal aim is the security and aggrandizement of his domains" (Luard, 1986: 149).

conflicting social interests' are changing through socio-historical time-space (Vratuša-Žunjić, 1995).

The main fault of Huntington's paradigm is in its assumption that civilizations are internally homogenous, wherefore is powerless to account for two crucial "exceptions": first, the social antagonisms that escalate to armed confrontation within the same civilization, and second, the phenomena of alliances among social groups stemming from different civilizations. Good example for the first exemption is the ongoing war between the autonomist and secular Muslim nationalists led by Fikret Abdić in the Republic of Western Bosnia, on the one hand, and centralist Muslim fundamentalists headed by Alija Izetbegović in Sarajevo, on the other. The illustration for the second divergence is the formation of the state union and war alliance between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Catholic Christian Croats, designed under the diplomatic auspices and military help of Catholic and Protestant Americans and Germans, and aimed against Orthodox Christian Bosnian Serbs.

State-centered paradigm

Huntington's civilization paradigm aroused polemics. The main objective of critics like Fouad Ajami for example, is Huntington's enthronement of civilizations as the fundamental subjects of international relations "despite the obligatory passage that states will remain 'the most powerful actors in world affairs'". Like other proponents of this research paradigm, Ajami rejects trans-national explanatory models and emphasizes that the lines of armed conflicts do not coincide with civilizations' boundaries. They consider nation state's interest to defend itself from the encroachment of other states and/or to maximize its power in the interstate system, to be the determining factor of armed conflicts. These political "realists" emphasize that the majority of contemporary nation states came into being through protracted civil and international wars. They expect that in the foreseeable future the state-creation, national unification and secession issues would dominate international agenda of armed conflicts especially in those parts of the world where the state, nation and religion still do not coincide (Ajami, 1993: 2-9; Kalevi, 1991: 323).

Nonetheless, they leave out of the picture the concrete mechanisms through which this lack of coincidence has been produced and is still being reproduced in the same parts of the world. It is well known, for instance, that after 1878. Austro-Hungarian rule tried to compensate the losses in Germany and Italy by conquering the territories of south Slovenes. Under the label of cultural mission in Balkans, they applied age old rule of domination: *divide et impera*. They introduced anti-Serbian discrimination and deepened religious divisions. Subservience to mutually competing ruling classes of Western-Catholic, Eastern-Orthodox and Asian-Muslim powers, deadly colliding in the territory of B&H, had left to peoples of former Yugoslavia the inheritance of mutual mistrust and hate. They are fostered by the painful memories of killing, periodically reactualized, inflicted ones upon the others in the service of, or in the alliance with, foreign rulers. In the century of national awakening in central Europe, when the Prussian Protestants and

Bawarian Catholics overcame its religious divisions and became united into German nation, "Balkanization of the Balkan" was fashioned with strategic aim to prevent the strengthening of Serbian nation state creating movement and its Piemonte role in Balkans.

Ajami, who ventured "into the nooks and crannies" of the Balkans like Huntington, discovered there "the scramble for turf" only "between Croatian nationalism and its Serbian counterpart, their "joint venture" in carving up Bosnia," and not the "fight of the inheritors of Rome, Byzantium and Islam." He failed to notice pan-Islamism in "the thicket of these pan-movements." Ajami and the majority of western commentators isolate the Serbian nationalism as the most responsible for the outbreak of war. He claims, without giving any empirical evidence, that "Serbia had had a measure of hegemony in the old system" (Ajami, 1993: 5). Similarly, George Schoepflin asserts that disintegration of Yugoslavia left Serbs in the category of former dominant minorities. According to him, for all Serbs now suffer the traumatic losses of material benefits and privileges in disposal of goods, information, connections with bureaucratic and symbolic power, they are trying to maintain these privileges by military force (Schoepflin, 1995: 167).

These advocates of nation state-centered paradigm interpretation of the war in B&H share the same starting analytical flaw as the advocates of civilization-centered paradigm: implicit assumption that some supra-individual collectivity, in this case ethnic group organized in nation state, presents internally homogenous chief subject of international relations. Their advocates hardly ever mention any kind of social stratification within the particular civilization or nation state.

Class-centered paradigm

Subjects of social interaction in the strict sense of the word can be only individuals, and not supra-individual collectivities. However, paying too much attention to the individual's ideas and creative interpretations of their social situations risks the entanglement in the one-sidedness of nominalism neglecting the socially structured "external limitations" to individual's choices of action aims and means.

Both supra-individualistic and nominalistic oversights can be overcome on the middle level of theoretical abstraction between the general and individual. On the level of particular originates the relational category of social class. It is defined by inducement of social groups occupying/playing opposite places/roles in social division of labor to contrary types and directions of thinking and acting in concrete social situations.

However, contradictory interests of social classes to maintain/abolish their privileged/subordinate social *habitus* are very seldom defined in class terms. They are more often expressed in ethnic and religious terms. The immense identification of population at large with common religious and national values is understandable if we take into account that hierarchical division of labor persists not only inside the confines of individual modern nation states but also among them. It is only to be expected that members of both ruling and exploited classes would be homogenized by common secular or sacred ideology in those states in which there exists geo-politically, ethnically, racially

and/or religiously influenced concentration of commanding/executing social roles. Namely, in such societies it is fairly easy for native ruling elites to persuade subordinated classes that they share more common interests than with the corresponding classes in other global societies whose members perform on average better/worse equipped and rewarded roles in international division of labor. Frustrated and exploited, atomized, unorganized and powerless lower classes are from their own side prone to divert their aggression from much stronger native ruling classes, to the members of equally exploited and oppressed members of other ethnic and religious groups, whom they perceive as competitors for scarce jobs in the times of crisis.

Class-centered paradigm possesses the advantage of being able to avoid mechanic separation of the so called "endogenous" factors of social (dis)integration processes (on which insist civilization-centered paradigm), on the one hand, and "exogenous" factors (on which insist state-centered paradigm), on the other.⁶ It considers both the influence of internal division of labor and power on the character of inclusion in international division of labor, as well as of the influence of international social power relations on the changes of the internal ones.

The case of war in B&H - research instruments and results

The key concept of the position in social division of labor in this paper is, according to available material, operationalized on the basis of the occupations' typology of the Federal Bureau of Statistics⁷. It is elaborated by taking into account the qualifications of the examinees from various work places. As it can be seen through the comparison of census data from 1981 (see footnote 7) and research data from 1989/90 (Table 2, column 1), the category of management personnel was over-proportionally represented in stratified samples. This was done with aim to enable closer examination of the economic and political elite's attitudes. While interpreting the research results, it should be also kept in mind that the categories of peasants and workers in the samples are under-proportionally represented, while the "other" category is over-represented. The category of artisans and private entrepreneurs from the sample could not be compared with the corresponding census data. The 1981 census did not include ownership as the social status determination criterion of rising importance, even though the "overflow" of state and social resources onto the private accounts of economic, political and cultural elite in the

⁶ Among many special issues dedicated to the analysis of the "breaking and/or disintegration" of Yugoslavia, the one published in *Sociološki pregled (Sociological Review)*, 1994, No. 2, with contributions of Miodrag Ranković, Mladen Lazić, Mihajlo Marković and others, distinguishes itself from others by the attempt to overcome this mechanical division.

⁷ I will present it on the example of occupational structure of active population in B&H according to 1981 census: peasants and related occupations - 23.8%; miners, industrial and related workers - 36.1%; trade workers - 4.7%; service workers - 5.6%; defense personnel - 1.8%; administrative and related workers - 8.6%; experts and artists - 8.5%; management personnel - 1.6%; active population not exercising occupation - 7.4%; other - 1.9% (Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1984).

foreign banks had already begun in the sixties. The sample from 1989/90 also did not include sufficient number of small, middle and big private entrepreneurs.

Interest in privatization and opening towards foreign capital of emerging post-socialist power elite⁸ caused the change of the social basis of regime support. As soon as the main social pillars of the regime undergo the change, its integrative and legitimization ideology changes too. Looking for the post-socialist legitimization ideology, ideological representatives of power elites in all republic and provinces came up with "declarations", "memorandums" and other lists of national and/or confessional interests stressing that they can be realized only within the nation state. In the absence of research instrument constructed directly for the analysis of these processes of nation state formation and legitimization ideology change in the social space of former Yugoslavia in general and in B&H in particular, among the available question from the 1989/90 research I have chosen few that seemed to be the most relevant. The percentage of expressed agreement with the selected statements served as the indicator of the degree to which these processes have advanced in the time of research in individual republics and provinces (see Table 1, in Appendix) and which social groups were their main bearers (see Table 2, in Appendix).

The first question asked examinees whether they and to what degree agreed with the basic premise given in every national ideology that "every nation must have its state". The sequence of republics and provinces according to the average percentage of examinees' complete and partial agreement with this statement, fairly closely follows the sequence in which it came to the manifest expression of the long-standing latent conflict of provincial, republican and federal power elites regarding their transformation into sovereign rulers of independent nation states. First on the list is K&M with 84.7%, followed by Slovenia (48.8), Macedonia (40.4), Croatia (20.6), Montenegro (18.0), Serbia (14.3), Vojvodina (8.6) and B&H at the end with 6.7%.

From the Table 1. it is obvious that significant differences are existing between the attitudes of the same ethnic/confessional group's members toward the "nation-state" and other statements when they reside in "home" or other republics and provinces. This hints to the conclusion that the opinions of the examinees are not influenced so much by their ethnic belonging as such, as they are influenced by concrete situation in their living environment.

Validity of the nation-state statement as indicator of the phase of the nation state formation process is sustained by the fact that the sequence of republics and provinces remains almost identical when we rank them according to the percentage of examinees' agreement with the control question, measuring the presence of one of the motives for nation state creation - the inter-ethnic/confessional apprehension in 1989/90: "Among nations good cooperation can be materialized but never complete trust" (Table 1, statement No. II). Slovenia and K&M remained on the first two places, and B&H

⁸ On the attempt of the technocratic fraction of the collective owners class to obtain through the privatization of control over basic means of production, administration and communication much safer social self-reproduction device than it was the previous mechanism of appointments to commanding roles in party and state apparatuses by the upper layers of federal state bureaucracy see Vratuša-Zunjić, 1993a.

remained on the last. Approximately two years before the outbreak of open hostilities at least two fifths of examinees, including those declared as Yugoslavs in low ranked B&H, agreed that complete trust between nations was not possible.

Rather high average level of expressed insecurity and mistrust feeling in 1989/90 did not have much chance to be diminished through inter-ethnic marriages among examinees Albanians, Muslims in Serbia, Macedonians and Slovenians. At least one third of them declared that the national belonging "is very important" consideration while picking the spouse (statement No. III in Table 1.). Serbs, especially when they were in a local minority position, expressed the greatest readiness to integrate in the living environment through inter-ethnic marriages.

Considerable inter-ethnic distance is registered also when it is measured by the percentage of examinees belonging to one ethnic group who prefer their work colleges to be from the same group. Only in Vojvodina and B&H there is less than one third of all examinees who are looking for colleges exclusively inside their own ethnic group. Inside B&H examinees Croats have shown greatest tendency to narrow the pool of potential family and work partners to their own ethnic group, while examinees Yugoslavs prefer to cooperate at work with Yugoslavs (statement No. IV in Table 1).

The assumption derived from class-centered paradigm that attitudes of examinees are more strongly influenced by their place and role in social division of labor than by their ethnic/confessional belonging is confirmed by the fact that Coefficients of Contingency are lower in the second case than in the first (compare Table 1 and Table 2, statements No. I, No. V, No. VI, rubric CC).

Average complete and partial agreement of particular occupational groups' members in B&H with the statements given in Table 2. allows to discern the differences between bureaucratic and technocratic fraction of collective owners in B&H with respect to the question of preferable economic reproduction organization: 47.9% of examinees managers in B&H are in agreement with the statement that private ownership is the basis of progress, while somewhat smaller number of politicians did so (39.2%) (No. V, Table 2.). Technocrats in B&H and in other less developed republics did not feel confident enough to overtake the risks of autonomous entrepreneurial decisions. Thereby they have more often (29.6%) than politicians (22.4%) agreed with the statement that "the state must have more influence in economy today" (No. VI, Table 3.). Managers in Croatia developed more consistent market orientation.

More pronounced difference between directors and politicians in B&H appears with respect to recognizance of politicians' and workers' interests as confronted: directors see them so in 28.2% of cases, but politicians only in 17.5% This distinction did not repeat itself in perception of experts' and workers' interests as opposed: only slightly more politicians (7.0%) perceived them so than managers (6.3%). As for the existence of technocratic/bureaucratic rift in B&H, the most indicative is the difference in perception of the relations between the interests of politicians and experts: while directors are considering them to be conflicting in 30.3% of cases, politicians see them in conflicting perspective only in 16.8% of cases. Contrary to this, answers of different ethnic/

confessional group's members to the same questions in B&H vary only few percentage points (statements No. VII, No. VIII and No. IX in Table 1).

Workers of both higher (39.04%) and lower qualifications (36.5%) in B&H are not excessively enthusiastic about private property. In that respect they are more alike to local ruling elites than to their comrades in more developed republics (in Croatia 58.7% of highly skilled workers agreed with the private property statement). In less developed Montenegro very indicative is high percentage of agreement of unskilled/semiskilled (57.1%) and skilled/highly skilled workers (60.3%) with this statement involving the abolishment of social and public property (it could not have been presented in this table for the lack of space). It can be accounted for by the existence of "tourist rent" accessible to all, including the lower social strata (Elaković, Brangjolica, 1985: 295-313). Outside of the tables had to remain also the datum that non-skilled and semi-skilled Albanian workers in underdeveloped K&M have expressed among all examinees workers in the entire former Yugoslavia the highest level of agreement with idea of "progressiveness" of private property (78.2%). This amounts to more than twice in regard to 33.3% of Serbian workers' agreement from K&M of the same qualification. This phenomenon is partly elucidated by the absence/presence of coalition with local political rulers of Serbian nationality after the adoption of new constitutional amendments and abolition of veto right of this Serbian province in march 1989. This interpretation is sustained by the fact presented in Table 2, statements VII and IX, revealing that in K&M examinees Albanians have significantly more often evaluated the interests' relations of politicians-workers and politicians-experts as confronted than the examinees Serbs.

Average research results contained in the Table 2. do not give enough ground for the conclusive inference whether the bureaucratic or technocratic collective owner's class's fraction have shown more inclination towards the new power legitimization ideology based in nation state in B&H. Both directors and political functionaries agreed with the statement about the necessity of nation state in only 6.3% of cases, 0.4% below the average. Therefore I was obliged to desagregate average results for every work place according to nationality of examinees. This operation disclosed that above average results had only directors Croats (6 out of 29 or 30%) and politicians Croats (5 of 34 or 14.7%). No Muslim politician (of 49) nor Muslim manager (of 50) agreed with the "nation state" statement, while only 2 of 41 Serbian managers and 2 out of 38 Serbian politicians did so. In Croatia itself the directors Croats had among all professional groups almost the highest percentage of agreement with the necessity of nation state (34.2%), surpassed only by experts employed in industry (35.1%). Politicians Croats followed them closely (30.9%). In Serbia it was politicians Serbs who had almost the highest percentage of agreement with the nation-state statement. They were exceeded only by Serbian security personnel (21.6%), while Serbian managers expressed three times less enthusiasm for nation state (6.7%). The fact that in these two republics members of economic or political elite and of state repression apparatus openly showed above average agreement with the "nation state" statement, which implied distraction of Yugoslavia, indicates that in Serbia and Croatia the process of nation state formation in the time-scope of the research was already/almost terminated.

In B&H, on the contrary, the statement about the necessity of nation state found its supporters among non-qualified workers (11.4%). This vocational category is seriously hit by structural joblessness and from the state have expected unemployment financial help and the reservation of the scarce working places for the members of one's own ethnic group members. This dependence on the state explains why non-skilled workers in B&H have perceivable less often answered that the interests of politicians and workers were opposed (16.3%) then their highly skilled colleges (37.1%). Among Muslim examinees the highest degree of agreement with "nation state statement" expressed Muslim experts employed in social services (6 of 27 or 22.2%). This occupational category is the professional producer and disseminator of ideology in educational, scientific, cultural institutions and is oriented toward the state as potential employer. Among Serbian examinees in B&H the highest score had non skilled workers (10%, 4 of 40).

These data confirm the hypothesis that the process of nation formation was at the time of research in B&H still in the initiation phase. It is the phase of national program conception with the main role still played by humanist intellectuals bearing the task to wage sharp verbal polemics on nation name, language and historical rights to the territories, while non-skilled workers are the main consumers of thus disseminated ideology. Skilled and highly skilled workers in B&H still had not accepted the idea of nation state, while Croat elite in B&H had advanced the most towards the creation of Herzeg-Bosnia.

As for the very low average percentage of expressed agreement of examinees in B&H (except for above-average responses of examinees Croats) to the question concerning the necessity of nation state, at least four explanations are possible.

The first one is that both Serbs and Muslims have their co-nationals scattered in more republics and provinces. They saw in Yugoslavia the opportunity to stay together inside one multi-ethnic state with the status of constitutive nation, avoiding in such way the minority status in separate nation states.

The second reason for so low percentage of nation state partisans in B&H should be searched for in the fact that in this republic the financial resources received from the Federal Fond for the Development of Underdeveloped were put to somewhat better use than in province K&M. In the period 1947-1988 the lagging behind of K&M, measured by usual economic development indicator -social product per inhabitant, increased in relation to the most developed Slovenia from 3.3 to 8.6 times, while the cleavage between B&H and Slovenia widened somewhat slower (from 1.9 to 2.9).⁹

Fairly speedier economic development and more equilibrated ethnic/religious structure enabled greater degree of equalization of the Muslims, Serbian and Croat active population's index of participation¹⁰ in the most desired and the best rewarded

⁹ Calculated according to Mihajlović (1990): 32, tab. 4.

¹⁰ Index of participation in this paper is defined as the quotient of the relative percentage of one ethnic/confessional group in the given profession and the relative percentage of the same group in the active population multiplied by 100. It was calculated on the basis of Savezni zavod za statistiku (The Federal Statistical Bureau), 1984.

commanding work roles and managing occupations, than in other republics and provinces: 84, 92 and 97 respectively.¹¹ Taking also into account the index of participation of Muslims, Serbs and Croats in expert professions (75, 93 and 100 respectively), as the most important recruiting pool for the membership of economic and political power elite in all contemporary societies, it comes to light that experts Muslims in B&H had in fact greater chance from experts Croats and Serbs to become top political and economic managers. Most of the apparent Muslim lagging behind in ruling positions disappears also if we "decompose" the group of Yugoslavs, whose index of participation in ruling roles is the highest in B&H - 186, and couple them with ethnic/confessional group of their ancestors.¹²

However, index of participation of Muslims in commanding roles was still lower in other republics and provinces in which Muslims did not have relative majority. Their average index for the whole of former Yugoslavia amounted to 79 (for Croats 102 and for Serbs 89). It can be therefore reasonably argued that one of the motives of Muslim leaders to create their own "mother" state in which they would soon get absolute majority, was to assure its exclusive support for themselves in attaining and preserving the commanding social roles. In these conditions they would not need any more the identification of their confessional belonging with the national one, which they demanded when it was the only way for them to become nominated to the ruling positions according to the "national key". Some Muslim ideologists already claim that they are not neither Serbs nor Croats, but autochthon "Boshnyaks", thus bearers and defenders of Bosnian "statehood" (Zulfikarpašić, 1991: 33).

Third feasible explanation should be sought for in the fact that in B&H the political parties formed of previous communists, non-communists and/or anti-Communists established on national/confessional recruitment's and legitimization basis, were formed the latest in comparison to other republics. The dramatic events that happened in a year and a half after the research was performed, brought to the surface the new elite in economic, politic and culture. At the time of research in B&H 89.0% of directors and 95.8% of politicians were still in the League of Communists.

The fourth possible explanation for apparent lack of support to the idea of nation state creation in B&H at the time of research, must remain in the form of hypothesis because of the insufficient empirical evidence: in 1989/90 within all ethnic/religious and occupational groups in B&H still prevailed the awareness that the realization of nation

¹¹ In K&M, for instance, index of participation of Muslims, Albanians and Serbs in commanding professions were 87, 86 and 132 respectively in 1981.

¹² The analysis of ethnic origin of persons who declared themselves as Yugoslavs requires a special research. Here I will only cite the data gathered in 1989/90 research in B&H. TO the question "What is the nationality of Your grandfather" examinees who declared themselves as Yugoslavs answered in the following way: 45.1% Muslims, 32.3% Serbs, 11.9% Croats, 5.6% Yugoslavs, 4.2% others and 0.9% did not answer. The same examinees answered that their fathers and mothers were Muslims in 31.8% and 35.0% of cases, Serbs in 27.3% and 26.1% of cases, Croats in 10.7% and 13.9% of cases, Yugoslavs in 25.2% and 21.7% of cases and 0.9% and 0.6% did not answer. Constitutional proclamation of members of Muslim religious community for the nation in 1971 stopped the tendency of Muslims to declare themselves as Yugoslavs. This is evident from the Table 3, in Appendix.

state idea in multi-ethnic community must lead to bloody war, mutual extermination and forced mass migrations of populace.

Striking contrast between the apparent absence of "pro nation state" attitudes of the greatest part of B&H examinees in 1989/90 and tragic civil, ethnic and religious war that less then two years after it erupted with ruthless violence, confirms many times reiterated experience that answers to survey questioners are not giving enough basis for reliable predictions. The idyllic picture of practical absence of nationalistic attitudes, undergo profound and abrupt change after critical events like violent inter-ethnic/confessional clashes or parliamentary and presidential elections in the conditions of social crisis, instability and uncertainty. The positions of newly elected political leaders also changed very quickly. Alija Izetbegović, who in the eighties was sentenced for propagation of pan-Islamic order,¹³ became the new president of B&H after the withdrawal of Fikret Abdić who had received the greatest number of votes in 1990 elections. During the January 1991 talks with Kiro Gligorov, once a president of Federal Yugoslav People's Assembly and after the 1990 elections the new president of Macedonia, Izetbegović still estimated that B&H was vitally interested for the preservation of Yugoslavia. However, in the February of the same year, during the session of both Houses of the B&H Parliament Izetbegović declared: "For independent B&H I would sacrifice peace, bur for that peace in B&H I would not sacrifice its sovereignty" (Kovačević, Putnik, 1994: 33). All this means that it is enough to have little but well-organized nucleus of transformed old and new economic and political power elites and their ideological representatives, to come to the establishment of the new state power and the complete transformation of dominant power legitimization ideology.

The war broke out when the constitutional principle of consensus decision making was abandoned and when the parliamentary coalition of Croatian Democratic Community and Muslim Party of Democratic Action outvoted Serbian Democratic Party on the issue of Referendum concerning the staying in Yugoslavia or leaving it. "International community" violated the principle of inviolability of internationally recognized borders of SFR Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and recognized administrative borders of individual former republics as international borders, on the other. Thus all former Yugoslav nations were given the right of self-determination except the Serbs. Serbs therefore refused to be turned again into *raya* - Orthodox serfs of Islamized Serbs. No ethnic/confessional group wanted to be reduced to low rewarded primary raw materials production roles. In 1981 Serbs were still "over-represented" just in such roles. Their index of participation in peasant population was 136 in B&H and 132 in entire former Yugoslavia, while the same index for Muslims was 83 and 77 respectively, and for Croats 112 and 81. Especially the members of educated elite feared that in Islamic theocracy they would become

¹³ Izetbegović affirmed that "there can be no coexistence between Islam religion and non-Muslim social and political institutions" in countries in which Muslims represent the majority of the population. After the phase of Islamic renaissance this assertion implies the waging of holly war (*djihad*) against those who do not believe in Allah as the one and only god, in the phase of political revolution and power conquering, with the aim of creating "great Islamic federation from Maroco to Indonesia" where Kur'an would be the supreme law (Izetbegović, (1970)1990: 22,37,43,46; Jevtić, 1993: 107-114, 216-220).

discriminated second rate citizens without access to jobs in educational, cultural and media institutions.¹⁴

Making haste to become part of developed central European region, Slovenian and Croatian elites did not want to be slowed down by less developed eastern and southern parts of Second Yugoslavia, forgetting that they need their cheap energy, raw materials and local markets for their internationally insufficiently competitive industrial products. Their dreams to create "independent" nation states were again supported by ruling classes in reunited Germany, Vatican and Austria, having their own dreams of eastward expansion at least to the rivers of Danube and Drina. With the help of USA ruling elites, attempting to defend their world hegemony from rising competition in EU and Far East and to solve their economic recession problems through instigation and perpetuation of wars of low intensity far away from their shores, new and old ruling elites in "Independent State Croatia" are completing the XIX century program of Ante Starčević to exterminate "Slavo-Serbs" as "obstructive interfering factor", "lower race", "trash of nations", "enemy of the people's and homeland's freedom", and "wild dogs" (Starčević, 1893, t. III, 162, 205, 299, 342, 373) through killing, expulsion or conversion into Catholicism (Psunjski, (1944, 1995).

Serbian traditional self-interested ally, Russia, was and still is, too weak to help them, being itself exposed to pressures of separatist Islamic and other movement. These movements are approximately openly supported by the western power elites, trying to assure their as free as possible access to Russian markets, raw materials and cheap but well trained labor force. Attempt of power elites in USA and in European Union to "extinguish" the war nucleus at the strategically important Balkan crossroads through the support of only that side in the conflict for which they asses that it would become their "cooperative client" in the region, does not bring us nearer to the solution. It only leads to the spreading of the conflict and to the World War III, in which, however, if it occurs there could be no winners (Vratuša-Žunjić, 1993b: 529-30).

Conclusion

Class-centered perspective fulfills Huntington's condition for paradigm approval for it "accounts for more crucial facts in equally simple or simpler terms" (Huntington, 1993b: 190). At the same time it avoids holistic-nominalistic and endogenous-exogenous false dilemmas ingredient in the civilization- and nation state-centered paradigms. It introduces pluridimensional approach on the middle level of theoretical abstraction. The main observation unit is neither civilizations nor nation states, but intra- and inter- civilization and intra- and inter- national class alliances. The most important potential for war escalation is clashes of such class alliances for the maintenance of the privileged positions in the local and international social division of labor, or the abolishment of the

¹⁴ From the following citation one can see that this fear was not without foundation: "Education of the people and especially the means of massive influence - press, radio, television and film - should be in the hands of people whose Muslim moral intellectual authority is unquestionable" (Izetbegović, 1990:32).

underprivileged ones. Wars are occurring most frequently between societies with high levels of interaction not because "interaction frequently reinforces existing identities and produces resistance, reaction and confrontation" (Huntington, 1993b: 192), but in the cases when their members have socially structured unequal chances to satisfy their material and spiritual needs. In multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies class-specific attitudes are additionally mediated by ethnic and confessional belonging, especially if there exists geographical concentration of particular ethnic/confessional groups in economically unequally developed regions, as it was and still is the case in Yugoslavia and B&H.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Complete and partial agreement of the examinees with the statements No. I to No.IX* expressed in the average percentages by Republic/Province and by nationality

Sample	Statement								
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Repub./prov:count (%)									
K&M: 1032 (100.0)	84.7	69.6	82.8		72.4	52.6	61.3	22.0	42.7
Albanians.: 907 (87.9)	88.1	69.8	85.0	54.5	73.4	51.6	63.4	22.2	46.0
Serbs: 90 (8.7)	60.0	71.1	70.0	48.9	63.3	57.8	44.4	16.7	21.1
CC	.35181	.10227	.29587	.67984	.11628	.0158	.17724	.14260	.21079
SLOV.: 1395 (100.0)	48.8	70.6	26.7		59.0	44.6	21.6	12.1	21.6
Slovenians. 1244 (89.2)	50.0	71.5	29.4	72.2	60.0	44.3	21.3	12.4	21.3
Croats: 51 (3.7)	37.3	72.5	2.0	15.7	47.1	31.4	27.5	5.9	11.8
Serbs: 40 (2.9)	30.0	62.5	0.0	2.5	55.0	62.5	22.5	10.0	22.5
CC	.24934	.11996	.35269	.56588	.19102	.12421	.11458	.08642	.11458
MAC.: 1288 (100.0)	40.4	64.9	47.4		47.0	55.4	26.9	13.4	16.8
Macedon.: 945 (73.4)	31.2	60.4	39.6	35.2	41.5	48.1	20.5	12.5	17.2
Albanians: 226 (17.5)	77.0	80.1	81.0	77.0	71.2	75.7	50.9	14.6	15.9
CC	.36438	.20147	.34189	.68650	.24585	.25652	.27642	.11744	.13374
CROAT.: 2771(100.0)	20.6	49.7	13.6		55.3	37.1	25.2	8.2	18.5
Croats: 2030	25.0	53.9	17.5	34.4	59.0	36.0	25.1	8.0	18.3
Serbs: 361	8.9	39.3	3.3	4.7	44.0	44.0	25.2	7.2	18.8
Yugosl.:	8.0	48.8	6.9	24.4	44.0	34.0	26.4	9.6	21.6
CC	.19996	.18873	.27448	.38487	.15157	.10314	.07336	.09082	.07465
MONT.: 958 (100.0)	18.0	36.7	16.1		61.2	51.4	33.2	20.7	24.3
Montenegr.: 757 (79.0)	17.0	38.6	15.2	39.0	59.3	49.8	36.3	21.7	25.8
Albanians:36 (3.8)	69.4	36.1	33.3	44.4	77.8	47.2	22.2	16.7	11.1
Muslims: 63 (6.6)	11.1	28.6	12.7	34.9	66.7	44.4	17.5	9.5	14.3
CC	.29637	.20619	.26618	.72226	.12530	.20387	.21740	.16654	.21367

SERB.**: 3320(100.0)	14.3	60.4	20.4		52.9	47.1	26.6	11.2	16.6
Serbs: 2827 (85.2)	14.9	62.6	20.0	32.6	53.9	46.6	26.2	11.1	16.0
Muslims: 179 (5.4)	12.3	42.5	46.4	8.4	39.7	55.9	27.4	10.6	15.6
Yugoslavs: 160 (4.8)	6.9	48.8	6.9	18.8	55.0	45.0	28.1	9.4	21.9
CC	.08675	.13108	.21863	.31918	.11712	.11190	.14790	.13037	.15981
VOYV.:1282(100.0)	8.6	51.1	9.0		59.1	44.5	28.9	10.3	18.4
Serbs: 796	7.3	56.7	11.2	17.3	60.4	44.3	26.9	9.5	18.3
Hungarians: 138	18.1	44.9	8.7	13.0	63.8	44.2	26.8	6.5	25.4
Croats: 78	9.0	34.6	9.0	14.1	55.1	43.6	26.9	12.8	10.3
CC	.18056	.16487	.30653	.39179	.14148	.10380	.13205	.14065	.15148
B&H: 2392(100.0) ¹⁵	6.7	39.6	16.0		41.0	45.5	27.1	9.3	17.9
Muslims: 995 (41.6)	5.4	39.3	18.6	7.5	39.1	47.4	28.0	10.5	16.9
Serbs: 630 (26.3)	6.3	39.5	11.7	7.5	39.5	47.0	24.6	8.4	18.3
Croats: 399 (16.7)	14.5	43.9	28.8	24.9	45.1	41.4	26.3	6.3	16.8
Yugosl.: 337 (14.1)	4.5	36.5	2.4	22.3	44.2	42.4	29.4	10.7	19.0
CC	.14507	.09501	.30935	.27464	.10119	.08460	.08048	.09486	.13061

*Statements: No. I: Every nation must have its state; No. II: Among nations good cooperation can be materialized but not also complete trust; No. III: While picking the spouse national belonging is very important consideration; No. IV With members of which nation would you like to work the most? No. V: Social progress will always rely on private property; No. VI: The state must have today greater role in administering the economy; No. VII: Interests of politicians and workers are confronted; No. VIII: Interests of experts and workers are confronted; No. IX: Interests of politicians and experts are confronted.

**Central Serbia; provinces Kosovo and Mitohiyan (K&M) and Vovvodina not included.

¹⁵ When we compare the sample's nationality structure with the census data in Table 3. in Appendix, it is obvious that the sample structure deviates from the real one the most "in favor" of Yugoslavs and "at the expense" of Serbs.

Table 2. Complete and partial agreement of the examinees with the statements No. I, V and VI expressed in the average percentages of the count by work place in B&H, Croatia and Central Serbia*

Work-place	No. I			No. V			No. VI		
	B&H	CRO	SRB	B&H	CRO	SRB	B&H	CRO	SRB
unemployed	6.2 193	24.2 99	17.1 269	54.4 193	58.6 99	58.7 269	44.6 193	25.3 99	44.9 269
peasant	7.5 332	21.8 377	15.3 825	51.0 332	63.9 337	59.0 825	50.6 332	38.2 377	42.5 825
non-skilled worker	5.6 123	15.3 157	19.1 94	34.9 123	40.1 157	37.2 94	48.8 123	60.5 157	57.5 94
semi-skilled worker	5.5 74	15.5 97	9.2 153	39.2 74	45.3 97	37.9 153	66.3 74	58.7 97	66.0 153
low-educated official	16.7 6	28.5 14	0.0 11	33.4 6	42.9 14	45.5 11	50.0 6	42.8 14	54.6 11
skilled worker	6.4 482	17.3 584	13.2 579	37.5 482	55.3 584	52.4 575	54.2 482	59.0 584	58.1 575
highly-skilled worker	11.9 143	18.6 151	14.3 105	42.1 143	56.3 151	49.5 105	46.2 143	43.8 151	39.0 105
office worker	4.2 165	16.0 206	15.3 210	38.2 165	58.2 206	51.9 210	44.2 165	30.1 206	52.8 210
technician	2.6 38	8.3 12	10.5 38	44.8 38	66.7 12	57.9 38	23.7 38	33.3 12	47.9 38
headworker	2.2 45	25.3 32	13.2 38	31.1 45	46.9 32	50.0 38	46.6 45	43.7 32	50.0 38
private artisan	6.3 32	25.0 28	4.8 21	65.6 32	67.9 28	80.9 21	21.9 32	21.4 28	80.9 21
free-lance profession	...	0.0 2	0.0 1	...	50.0 2	100.0 1	...	0.0 2	100 1
experts in industry	7.0 43	28.6 49	13.4 45	60.5 43	85.7 49	68.9 45	25.6 43	8.1 49	68.9 45
exp. in soc. services	14.9 74	28.3 159	17.5 131	53.2 193	64.7 159	65.8 131	36.5 74	13.8 159	65.7 131
experts in admin.	1.8 56	16.2 62	13.5 89	48.2 56	62.9 62	41.6 89	41.1 56	14.6 62	41.6 89
army, police, security	0.0 40	8.4 36	18.3 49	40.0 40	36.1 36	46.9 49	40.0 40	55.6 36	66.9 49
lower managerial managers	9.1 22	20.0 15	12.5 32	22.7 22	40.0 15	50.0 32	50.0 22	13.4 15	50.0 32
managers	6.3 142	27.9 147	9.9 141	47.9 142	68.1 147	63.8 141	29.6 142	4.9 147	63.7 141
politicians	6.3 143	25.0 140	16.9 136	39.2 143	45.0 140	33.1 136	22.4 143	10.7 140	33.1 136
others	8.4 239	23.3 404	13.1 357	31.8 239	55.6 404	45.7 357	49.4 239	37.4 404	45.7 357
Total	6.7 2392	20.7 2771	14.3 3320	41.0 2392	55.3 2771	53.8 3320	45.5 2392	37.1 2771	52.8 3320
Contingency Coeffic.	.2255	.2252	.1833	.3402	.2972	.3122	.3670	.4484	.3122

*Central Serbia; provinces Kosovo and Mitohijan and Vovodina not included.

Table 3. B&H: changes of ethnic structure 1948-81

Census	Total	%	Croats	%	Muslim	%	Serbs	%	Yugosl	%
1948	2565277	100.0	614123	23.9	788403	30.7	1136116	44.3	-----	---
1953	2847790	100.0	654229	23.0	891800	31.3	1264372	44.4	-----	---
1961	3277948	100.0	711665	21.7	842248	25.7	1406057	42.9	275883	8.4
1971	3746111	100.0	772491	20.6	1482430	39.6	1393148	37.2	43796	1.2
1981	4124008	100.0	758136	18.4	1629924	39.5	1320664	32.0	326280	7.9
1991	4364574	100.0	755895	17.3	1905829	43.7	1369258	31.4	239845	5.5

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Rezime

Vera Vratuša-Žunjić

SUKOB CIVILIZACIJA, NACIJA ILI DRUŠTVENIH KLASA?

Studija slučaja rata u Bosni i Hercegovini

Rad preispituje sposobnost teze o "sukobu civilizacija" i o "borbi nacija država za moć" da objasni fenomene "fuzionih" procesa u državama blagostanja Zapadne Evrope i "fisione" procese u zemljama Istočne i Centralne Evrope, kao i porast verski i etnički "obojenih" ratova na kraju XX veka. Izbegavajući holističku grešku tretiranja civilizacija i nacionalnih država kao homogenih entiteta, autor ističe promenljive domaće i međunarodne saveze društvenih klasa kao osnovne subjekte intrinzično povezanih procesa društvene dezintegracije/integracije. Savremene ratove autor analizira u okviru strukturalne krize proširene reprodukcije u svetskim razmerama i pratećih promena razvojne ideologije i strategije, koje na različit način pogodaju pojedine društvene grupe. Artikulacija ratnih ciljeva u nacionalističkim i religioznim izrazima na kraju XX veka protumačena je kao efikasna zamena za kompromitovane sekularne ideologije. Funkcije ovih ideologija, međutim, ostaju iste: mobilizacija i legitimizacija nasilne odbrane stare, ili stvaranje nove društvene podela rada, kako u okviru pojedinih društava organizovanih u nacionalne države tako i između njih. Istorijsko-geografska i etničko-konfesionalna koncentracija naredbodavnih i izvršilačkih uloga u domaćoj i međunarodnoj podeli rada i izvora prouzrokuje da klasni interesi budu formulisani u izrazima statusnih (verskih, etničkih) grupa.

Ova hipoteza je proverena kroz studiju rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Empirijska osnova za teorijske zaključke je izvedena iz dva izvora: 1) popisni podaci o etničkoj, verskoj, obrazovnoj i profesionalnoj strukturi stanovništva; 2) podaci prikupljeni u istraživanju Konzorcijuma Jugosloven-

skih instituta društvenih nauka iz 1989/90 o stavovima ispitanika prema značaju nacionalne države i etničke pripadnosti, poželjnoj organizaciji društva i o stepenu sličnosti/sukoba između interesa društvenih grupa.

Ključne reči: paradigma, civilizacija, država nacija, klasa, indeks zastupljenosti, etnički i verski identitet, rat.